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Timely

3·~~U-Lf.T~ ·
This case

;~ ises 4"Sh~ritl a~ la~
~~,,

to (1} the scope of the speech and debate immunity for
congressmen and their aides:
figure" under Gertz and

(2} the meaning of "public

Time~ · Inc~

meaning of "public official" under
Sullivan:

,'

v. Firestone:

(3} the

New · York · Times · co~

v.

(4} and the application of the New·Yorks Times

privilege to verbal torts such as interference with contractual
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relations.
FACTS "AND "DECISION .BELOW:
•

Petitioner was

one of the first victims of Senator Proxmire's "Golden

___

Fleece"
Petitioner, a professor at Western Michigan
____......, awards.
..,
University and research director at Kalamazoo State Hospital,
had received a number of federal grants to study jaw-clenching
as an indicator of latent tension and agression.

The idea was

to develop objective means of spotting stress or hostility;
NASA, the Office of Naval Research, and others were interested
in the research in hopes of developing a way of screening and
monitoring astronauts, pilots, and other critical personnel.
large amount of the research was done on primates.

A

The

electrical activity of their jaw muscles was measured in
various stressful and non-stressful situations and under the
effect of various stimulants and depressants.

NASA, ONR, and

the National Science Foundation had funded some of this
research, and at the time of Senator Proxmire's actions
petitioner had grant applications pending before NSF, the
National Institute of Drug Abuse, and the National Institute of
Mental Health.
Proxmire's assistant, Schwartz, turned up petitioner's
research and recommended it as a candidate for the "Golden
Fleece" award.

A press release was drafted, and Schwartz read

its contents to petitioner for comment.

Petitioner protested

its inaccuracy and cited evaluations by the granting agencies
that his work was worthwhile, but Proxmire went ahead with the
release.

-

----

Three days later, Proxmire read the contents of the
___...

3.

-

release on the Senate floor.

The release characterized

petitioner's work as research into what angers monkeys, gnd
intimated that petitioner was collecting from different
agencies for the same work and making a personal fortune from
the government through his research.

The following month,

Proxmire sent out newsletters to 100,000 constituents repeating

---- -------------------------------------------------

his attacks on petitioner's research, and later in the year he
went on television and radio shows to continue his campaign
against petitioner.

Meanwhile Schwartz contacted the various
~

agencies that funded or proposed to fund petitioner's research
and applied pressure to cut off the funding.

According to

petitioner, Schwartz misrepresented various facts about
petitioner and his research and threatened the agencies with
retaliation unless they took. action against him.

Petitioner's

funding was ended, a fact for which Proxmire took credit in a
subsequent newsletter.
Petitioner brought a diversity suit against Proxmire
and Schwartz for defamation, intentional interference with
contracts and intentional interference with prospective
advantage.

The district court granted summary judgment for

Proxmire and Schwartz, holding that all of their conduct was
immunized under the Speech and Debate Clause, that even if
there were no immunity they enjoyed a qualified privilege under
New·York · Times · co~

because petitioner was both a public

official and a public figure, that no malice in the New ·York
Times · co~

sense could be proved in this case, and that even if

petitioner were a private figure state law defenses of fair

4.
comment and interested communications would bar liability.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

It agreed

that Proxmire and Schwartz enjoyed Speech and Debate Clause
immunity as to the press release and constituent newsletter but
not as to the radio and TV broadcasts or the followup
communications by Schwartz.

It agreed, however, that

petitioner was a public figure, as he had voluntarily sought
public
funding, had published scholarly articles, had been the
,....____........___
subject of several local newspaper articles, and had been able
to schedule a press conference to respond to Proxmire's attack.
The court distinguished Time;

· Inc~

v.

F~resyone,

424

u.s.

448

(1976), on the ground that petitioner had voluntarily sought
public founds and had in his scholarly articles affirmed the

(_

soundness of his research.

As the evidence did not raise a

question of material fact as to

ma~ice,

New · York · Times · co~

required dismissal of the defamation action.

The intentional

interference actions also required malice in the New · York ·Times
Co; sense and therefore properly were dismissed.

The court did

not address the question whether petitioner was a "public
official" under Gertz and

New · York · ~imes · co~

or whether state

law defenses and privileges also would bar the suit.
CONTENTIONS:

Petitioner argues that · the press release

and constituent newsletters went beyond the kinds of
communications immunized under the Speech and Debate Clause in
Gravel v.

united ~ States,

408

u.s.

610 (1972).

The

classification of petitioner as a public figure is inconsistent
with Gertz v. Robert ·welch;

· Inc~,

418

u.s.

323 (1974), and

5.

Firestone.

The assessment of malice by the court below was

based on demonstrably incorrect statements about the record and
was erroneous.
The respondents rest mainly on the opinion of the
court below.
DISCUSSION:

The speech and debate issue is important,

although a close question.

~

The court of appeals attempted to

assess what was the proper dissemination of legislative
information in light of the "informing function" of Congress.
It felt the press release and newsletters here were closer to
Gravel, when a legislator brought to public attention a matter
of public significance, than to

~

v. McMillan, 412

u.s.

306

(1973), when the Court recognized that public dissemination of
'- actionable information could be outside the scope of the
· immunity.

The question turns on an essentially factual issue:

the need for Proxmire to resort to a press release and
newsletters to bring to public attention the facts about
petitioner's research.

The line drawn by the court below

conflict directly with any decision of this Court.

The

question is important, however, and the area -is one that could
benefit from guidance by this Court.
The resolution of the Gertz issue is palpably
inconsistent with both Gertz and Firestone.
~

It seem wholly

unrealistic to tie "public figure" status to the receipt of
public funds:

It would be hard not to

ard a welfare

recipient as a public figure under the standard of the court

,.
' •,

6.

below.

Nor should publication of scholarly articles or local

newspaper coverage convert petitioner into a public figure.

I~

Mrs. Firestone had courted public attention more openly and
notoriously.

Petitioner never undertook voluntarily the risk

of calumny inherent to public life nor acquired the ready
access to the med1a necessary to rebut effectively scandalous
untruths.

/tyv

Under Gertz and Firestone, it was improper to

classify him as anything but a private figure.

In addition, the transposition of the New ·York ·Times
malice standard to the intentional interference torts presents
an independently certworthy issue.

The court believed that the

"malice" that is an element of these torts is equivalent to the
"malice" required by New ·York ·Times.

As this Court has

stressed on several occasions, however, New ·York ·Times used the
term in a special sense, and did not mean to advert to the
"desire to do harm" to which common law malice refers.
reverse also should be true.

The

It is not at all clear that a

state law tort that has as its elements an intentional and
deliberate interference with the contractual rights of another
person also must incorporate a "knowing or reckless disregard
of the truth" standard.

Schwartz's actions after the press

release appear to have been independently actionable, and the
application of New ·York ·Times to this conduct seems dubious at
best.
The importance of the Gertz and intentional
interference issues in this case is reinforced by the seeming
insignificance of the issues which the court of appeals did not

7.
reach.

It seems incredible to regard petitioner, who received

public money to support
under Gertz.

~is

research, as a "public official"

The resolution of the state law issues by the

district court also seem questionable.

The conduct of Schwartz

in particular appears to have been far outside any possible
"fair comment" or "interested communication" defense.

Further,

the district court did not advert to the independent claims
against Schwartz for intentional interference with contract and
prospective advantage.

As a prudential matter, it probably is

proper to discourage harassing suits against Congressmen
undertaking controversial but important functions.
oombro~ski

v.Eestland, 387

u.s.

82, 85 (1967).

See

On the other

hand, the facts of this case are far from ordinary, and suggest
the need to afford injured individuals some form of redress
within the judicial process.

In sum, the Gertz and intentional

interference issues seem certworthy both as a general matter
and in the context of this case.
There is a response.
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UCAETARY

MAR 2 8 1979
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON , D .C.

20510

OFFICE OF TH£ CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

March 26, 1979

Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr.
Clerk of the Supreme Court
Washington, D. C. 20543
Dear Mr. Rodak :
For your information, I am enclosing a copy of Senate
Resolution 113, which passed the Senate on March 22, 1979.
Sincerely,

S. Res. 113.

In the Senate of the United States,
March 22 (legislative day, February 22), 1979.
Whereas the Supreme Court of the United States on January 8,
1979, issued a writ of certiorari in the case of Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, et al.; and
Whereas this civil action against the Senator from Wisconsin
(Mr. Proxmire) seeks damages for actions that were performed within the scope of the Senator's duties and responsibilities as a Member of the Senate under the Constitution
of the United States; and
Whereas the Senate, by Senate Resolution 463, Ninety-fourth
Congress, has supported the defense of Senator Proxmire in
defending the civil action brought against him for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Senate; and

=::'""--·· :=....:.- vTnereasinthis case the Supreme Court will consider the scope
and meaning of the protection provided to Members of the
Congress by Article I, Section 6, of the United States
Constitution, the Speech and Debate clause, including the
application of this provision to Senators and their aides, and
the types of activity protected; and
Whereas this case involves the informing function of the Congress and the right of Members of the Senate to inform their
constituents, colleagues, and the public; and

2
Whereas this case involves the investigation and oversight functions of the Congress and the right of the Members of the
Senate to obtain information in their contact with the executive branch of the Government; and
Whereas the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals
have recognized the application of the Speech and Debate
clause to the conduct complained of in this case; and
Whereas a decision in this case may impair the constitutional
independence and prerogatives of every individual Senator,
and of the Senate as a whole; and
Whereas the Senate of the United States has a responsibility to
insure that its

int~rests

are properly and completely repre-

sented before the Supreme Court: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That there is established a committee of the
Senate consisting of the President pro tempore of the Senate,
the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate, and the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on
Rules and Administration. Such committee is authorized and directed to appear and/ or to file, on behalf of the Senate of the
United States, a brief as amicus curiae in the

case-oi~-iuteiliu- --.::-

son v. Proxmire et al., now pending in the Supreme Court of
the United States.
SEc. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy
of this resolution to the Supreme Court.
Attest:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543

March 29 , 19 79

MEMORANDUM TO THE COURT
RE:

Hutchinson v. Proxrnire
No. 78-680

The attached Resolution in the aboveentitled case was received yesterday from the
Secretary of the United States Senate.
Respectfully submitted,

~01 tVlf'

Michael Rodak, Jr.
Clerk
'
Attachment

Argued 4/17/79
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MEMORANDUM 'TO THE CONFERENCE:
Re:

78-680

Hutchinson v. Proxmire

I overlooked calling attention to the "public
figure" issue in this case.

My notes indicate a substantial number--but
perhaps not five--thought respondent was not a public
figure.
I agree but I am not sure as to the votes.
If four others so vote, it will be a simple matter to
add this holding.
Regards,

To: Mr .
Mr .
Mr .
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Ml' .
Mr.

Jm!t

i

JU<Jb~
Justic · l'l'P~
·t-

/

J

J usti , V·u ;!~ ...
,Tuot1 n•:J BL ·. :<c 'J.n
Ju"st i.e,('
Jv.r.;·'· Gt.1
;,·u.r.jt.ioo

Jll
,1-·'!'Ui s t

].'()
j

f~tc~ ·~-·'"on s

From : The Chief Justic e
\

Ist DRAFT

Circulat ed: MAY 2 G 1979

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Recirculated:-------No. 78-680

Ronald R. Hutchinson,
Petitioner,
On Writ of Certiorari to the United
v.
States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
William Proxmire and
Morton Schwartz.

~

---..--J

~ if

~5/27-zf'

[June -, 1979]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.

J '"'"-7~AA.L.t.
. - .._

·we granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1978), to resolve three ~
issues: ( 1) Whether a Member of Congress is protected by the
pye.Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 6,
..
against suits for allegedly defamatory statements made by the ~
Member in press releases and newsletters; (2) Whether peti- ~- A
J
tioner Hutchinson is either a "public figure" or~ "public of~~
ficial ," thereby making applicable the "actual malice" stand- ~ A1~ 1 ,-ard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); 1
'~
and (3) ~ether respondents were entitled to summary
~;
judgment.
-~ ·
Ronald Hutchinson, a research behavioral scientist, sued ~ ~
respondents , William Proxmire, a United States Senator, and £),. ~- , I
hi11 legislative assistant, Morton Schwartz, for defamation aris- ~
ing out of Proxmire's giving what he called his "Golden ~
c---Fleece" award. The "award" went to federal agencies that / ~?.... d
Neither the District Court nor t.he Court of Appeals considered
whether the standard of New York Times v. Su!livan, 376 U. S. 254
( 1964), can apply to an individual defendant rather than to a media defendant. At oral argument, counsel for Hutchinson stated that he had
not conceded that the New York Times standard did apply. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 18. We express no opinion on the issue.
1

5

}J ,

1

·-

J'-0

c.! \
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2

had sponsored Hutchinson's research. Hutchinson alleged
that in making the award and publicizing it nationwide, respondents had libeled him, damaging him in his prof~ional
and academic standing, and had interfered with his contractual relations. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
We reverse that part of the Court of Appeals judgment
holding that the Speech or Debate Clause protects press releases and newsletters. For reasons hereafter discussed, we
do not reach the other questions raised in the petition for
certiorari.
I
Respondent Proxmire is a United States Senator from Wisconsm. In March 1975 he initiated the "Golden Fleece of
the Month Award" to publicize what he perceived to be the
most egregious examples of wasteful governmental spending.
The second such award, in April 1975. went to the National
Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Navy, through the Office of Na.val Research, for spending almost half a million dollars during the
preceding seven years to fund Hutchinson's research. 2
At the time of the award, Hutchinson was director of research at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital. Before that
he had held a similar position at the Ft. Custer State Home.
Both the hospital and the home are operated by the Michigan
State Department of Mental Health; he was therefore a state
employee in both positions. During most of the period in
question he was also an adjunct professor at Western Michigan University. When the research department at Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital was closed in June 1975, Hutchinson became research director of the Foundation for Behavioral
There is disagreement over the actual total. The speech said the total
was "over $500,000." In preparation for trial, both sides have offereq
l,1igher estimates of the total amount.
· 1
2

'

i
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3

Re~earch, a no~profit organization. The research funding
was transferred from the hospital to the foundation.
1
The bulk of Hutchinson's research was devoted to the study
of emotional behavior. In particular, he sought an objective
measure of aggression, concentrating upon the behavior pat::.
terns of certain animals, such as the clenching of jaws when
they were exposed to various aggravating stressful stimulii. 3
The National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the Navy
were interested in the potential of this research for resolving
problems associated with confining humans in closed quarters
for extended periods of time in space and undersea explor~;ttion.
The Golden Fleece Award to the agencies that had sponsored Hutchinson's research was based upon research done for ·
Proxmire by Schwartz. While seeking evidence of wasteful
governmental spending, Schwartz read copies of reports that
Hutchinson had prepared under grants from NASA. Those
reports revealed that Hutchinson had received grants from the
Office of Naval Research, the National Science Foundation,
and the Michigan State Department of Mental Health.
Schwartz also learned that other federal agencies had funded
Hutchinson's research. After contacting a number of federal
and state agencies, Schwartz helped to prepare a speech for
Proxmire to present in the Senate; the text was then incorporated into an advance press release, with only the addition of
introductory and concluding sentences. Copies were sent to

1

•• 3 Reports of Hutchinson's research were published in scientjfic journals.
The research is not unlike the studies of ~ reported in less technical
periodicals such as the National Geographic Magazine. E. g., Fossey,
"More Years with 1\Iountain Gorillas," National Geographic Magazine 574
(1971); Galdikas-Brindamour, "Orangutans, Indonesia's 'People of the
Forest,'" National Geographic 444 (1975); Goodall, "Life and Death at
Combe," National Geographic 592 (1979); Goodall, "New Discoveries
Among Africa's Chimpanzees," National Geographic Magazine 272 (1963);
Strum, "Life with the 'Pumphouse Gang': New Insights into Baboon Behavior," National Geographic Magazine 672 (1975).

----- - -

..
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a mailing list of 275 members of the news media throughout
the United States and abroad.
Schwartz telephoned Hutchinson before April 18 to tell him
of the award; Hutchinson protested that the release contained
an inaccurate and incomplete summary of his research.
Schwartz replied that he thought the summary was fair.
In the speech Proxmire described the federal grants for
Hutchinson's research, concluding with the following comments: 4
"The funding of this nonsense makes me almost angry
enough to scream and kick or even clench my jaws. It
seems to me it is outrageous.
"Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers .
as well as his monkeys grind their teeth. In fact, the
good doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and .
in the process made a monkey out of the American
taxpayer.
"It is time for the Federal Government to get out of
this 'monkey business.' In view of the transparent
worthlessness of Hutchinson's study of jaw-grinding and .
biting by angry or hard-drinking monkeys, it is time we
put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the bureaucrats
who fund him have been taking of the taxpayer." 121.
Cong. Rec. 10803 (1975).
In May 1975, Proxmire referred to his Golden Fleece
4 Prm.:mire is not certain that he actually delivered the speech on the
Senate floor. He said that he might have merely inserted it into the Congressional Record. App., at 220-221. In light of that uncertainty, the
question arises whether a nondclivered speech printed in the Congressional
Record is covered .b y t.he Speech or Debate Clause. This Court has never
passed on tha.t question and neither the District Court nor the Court of
Appeals seemed to think it was important. Nevertheless, we assume, without deciding, that a speech printed in the Congressional Record carrjes
immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause as though delivered on the
floor.
.

78-680-0PINION
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Awards in a newsletter sent to about 100,000 people whose
names were on a mailing list that included constituents 'in
Wisconsin as well as persons in other states. The newsletter
repeated the essence of the speech and the press release.
Later in 1975, Proxmire appeared on a television interview
program where he referred to Hutchinson's research, though
he did not mention Hutchinson by name. 5
The final reference to the research came in a newsletter in
February 1976. In that letter Proxmire summarized his
Golden Fleece Awards of 1975. The letter did not mentio'n
Hutchinson's name, but it did report:

of

"- The NSF, the Space Agency, and the Office
Naval Research won the 'Golden Fleece' for spending
jointly $500,000 to determine why monkeys clench their
jaws.
"All the studies on why monkeys clench their jaws
were dropped. No more monkey business." App., at
168-171.
After the award was announced, Schwartz, acting on behalf
of Proxmire, contacted a number of the federal agencies that
has sponsored the research. In his deposition he stated that
he did not attempt to dissuade them from continuing to fund
the research but merely discussed the subject. 0 Hutchinson,
by contrast, contends that these calls were intended to persuade the agencies to terminate his grants and contracts.
5 The parties agree that Proxmire referred to research like Hutchinson's
on at least one television show. They do not agree whether there were
other appearances on either radio or television. Hutchinson has suggested
that there were others and has produced affidavits to support his suggestion. Proxmire cannot recall any others.
6 Senate Resolution 543 authorized respondents and an additional member of Proxmire's staff to give deposition testimony. 122 Cong. Rec.
29876 (1976).
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II
On April 16, 1976, Hutchinson filed this suit in the United~
States District Court in Wisconsin. 7 In Count I he alleget~
that as a result of the actions of Proxmire and Schwartz he
has "suffered a loss of respect in his profession , has suffered
injury to his feelings, has been humiliated, held up to public
scorn, suffered extreme mental anguish and physical illness
and pain to his person. Further, he has suffered a loss of income and ability to earn income in the future ." Count II
alleges that the respondents' conduct has interefered with
Hutchinson's contractual relationships with supporters of his
research . He later amended the complaint to add an allegation that his rights of privacy and peace and tranquility have
been infringed.
Respondents moved for a change of venue and for summary
judgment. In their motion for summary judgment they asserted that all of their acts and utterances were protected by
the Speech or Debate Clause. In addition, they asserted that
their criticism of the spending of public funds was privileged
under the free speech clause of the First Amendment. They
argued that Hutchinson was both a public figure and a public
official, and therefore would be obliged to prove the existence
of "actual malice." Respondents contended that the facts of
this case would not support a finding of actual malice.
Without ruling on venue. the District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment. 431 F. Supp. 1311
(WD ·w is. 1977). In so ruling, the District Court relied on
both grounds urged by respondent. It reasoned that the
Speech or Debate Clause afforded absolute immunity for respondents' activities in investigating the funding of Hutchinson's research. for Proxmire's speech in the Senate, and for
the press release covering the speech. The court concluded
On April 13, 1976, Hutchinson had written to Proxmire requesting that
he retract certain erroneous statements made in the 1975 press release.
7

.,
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that the investigations and the speech were clearly within the
ambit of the Clause. The press release was said to be protected because it fell within the 11 informing function" of Congress. To support its conclusion the District Court relied
upon cases interpreting the franking privilege granted to
Members by statute. See 39 U. S. C. § 3210.
Although the District Court referred to the 11 informing
function" of Congress and to the franking privilege, it did not
base its conclusion concerning the press release on those analogies. Instead, the District Court held that the 11press release, in a constitutional sens e, was
different than would
have been a television or radio broadcast of his speech from
the Senate floor." 8 431 F. Supp., at 1325. That the District
Court did not rely upon the 11 informing function" is clear from
its implicit holding that the newsletters were not protected.
The District Court then turned to the First Amendment to
explain the grant of summary judgment on the claims arising
from the newslette{ and interviews. It concluded that
Hutchinson could be classified both as a ''public figure" and
as a 11 public official" for purposes of determining respondents'
liability. !d., at 1327-1328. Having reached that conclusion, the District Court relied upon the depositions, affidavits,
and pleadings before it to evaluate Hutchinson's claim that
respondents had acted with 11 actual malice." The District
Court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact
on that issue. It held that neither a failure to investigate
nor unfair editing and summarizing could establish 11 actual
malice." It aiso held that there was nothing in the affidavits
or depositions of either Proxmire or Schwartz to indicate that
they ever entertained any doubt about the truth of their statements. Relying upon cases from other courts, the District
Court said that in determining whether petitioner had made
an adequate showing of "actual malice" summary judgment

no

Of course, in light of Proxmire's uncertainty, see n. 4, supra, there is
no assurance that there even was a "speech from the Senate floor."
8

./)-

5
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might well be the rule rather than the exception.
1330. 0
Finally, the District Court concluded:

!d., at

"But even if for the purpose of this suit it is found that
Dr. Hutchinson is a private person so that First Amendment protections do not extend to '[respondents] ,__rele~nt
state law dictates the grant of summary judgment."

~

The District Court held that the controlling state la.w was
either that of Michigan or the District of Columbia. Without
deciding which law would govern under Wisconsin's choice of
law principles, the District Court concluded that Hutchinson
would not be able to recover in either jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that th e Speech or
Debate Clause protected the statements made in the press release and in the newsletters. 579 F. 2d 1027 (CA7 1978). It
interpreted Doe v. McMillan, 414 U. S. 306 (1973), as recognizing a limited protection for the "informing function" of
Congress and concluded that distribution of both the press ·
release and the newsletters did not exceed the amounts required for legislative purposes. 579 F. 2d, at 1033. The
follow-up telephone calls and the statements made by Proxmire on television and radio were not protected by the Speech
or Debate Clause; they were, however, held by. the Court of
Appeals to be protected by ·the First Amendment. 10 It
9 Considering the nuances of the issues raised here, we are constrained
to express some doubt about the so-called " rule. " The proof of "actual
malice" C.'dls a defendant's state of mind into question·, N ew York Tim es v :
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964) , and do·es not readily lend itselfto summary
disposition . See 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§2730, at 590-592. Cf. H erbert v. Lando, U. S. (1979) . In the
present posture of the case, however, the propriety of dealing with such
comple:x issues by summary judgment is not before us.
10 R espondents did not cross-petition.
Neither did they argue that the
Speech or D ebate Cla~se protected the follow-up t elephone calls made J:>y

~
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reached that conclusion after first finding that, based on the
affidavits and pleadings of record, Hutchinson was a "public
figure." 11 The Court then examined the record to determine
whether there had been a showing by Hutchinson of "actual
malice." It agreed with the District Court "that, upon this
record, there is no question that [respondents] did not have
knowlege of the actual or probable 'falsity' of their statements." !d., at 1035. The Court of Appeals also rejected
Hutchinson's argument that the District Court had erred in
granting summary judgment on the claimed wrongs other
than defamation-interference with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional anguish, and invasion of
privacy:
"We view these additional allegations of harm as merely
the results of the statements made by the defendants. If
the alleged defamatory falsehoods themselves are privileged, it would defeat the privilege to allow recovery for
the specified damages which they caused." !d., at 1036.12
As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals did not review the District Court's holding that state law also justified summary
judgment for respondents.

III
The petition for certiorari raises three questions, One in.volves the scope of the Speech or r5'ebate Clau; ; another
involves First Amendment claims; a third concerns the appropriateness of summary judgment, embracing both a conSchwartz to governmental agencies or the television and radio interviews
of Proxmire. Accordingly, we have not reviewed the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect those
actions.
11
The Court did not decide whether the District Court was correct in
concluding that Hutchinson was also a "public official." 579 F. 2d, at
1035 n. 14.
12
Petitioner has not sought review of this conclusion; we express no
opinion as to its correctne<:s.
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stitutional issue and a state-law issue. The constitutional
issue arose from the District Court's view that solicitude for
the First Amendment required a more hospitable judicial attitude toward granting summary jud!!ment in a libel case.
Seen. 9, supra. The state-law issue arose because the District
Court concluded that, as a matter of local law, Hutchinson
could not recover.
Our practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions
if a dispositive nonconstitutiomll ground is available. See,
e. q. , Siler v. Louisville & Nash1·ille R. Co. , 213 U. S. 175, 193
(1909). Were we to follow that course here we would remand
to the Court of Appeals to review the state-law question which
it did not consider. If the District Court correctly decided
the state-law question . resolution of the First Amendment
issue would be unnecessary. We conclude, however, that special considerations in this case mandate that we first resolve
the Speech or Debate Clam:e question.
The purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to protect
Members of Congress "not only from the consequences of
litigation's results but also from the burden of defending
themselves." Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85
(1967). See alw Eastland v. United S ervicemen's Fund, 421
U. S. 491 , 503 (1975). If the respondents have immunity
under the Clause, no other questions need be considered for
they may "not be questioned in any other place."
In support of the Court of Appeals' holding that new·sletters
and press releases are protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause, respondents rely upon both historical precedent a.nd
present-day congressional practices. They contend that impetus for the Speech or Debate Clause privilege in our Constitution came from the history of parliamentary efforts to
protect the right of members to criticize the spendin.g of the
Crown and from the prosecution of a Speaker of the House of
Commons for publication of a report outside of Parliament.
Respondents also contend that in the modern day very little
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speech or debate occurs on the floor of either House; from
this they argue that press releases and newsletters are n.ecessary for Members of Congress to communicate with other
Members. For example, in his deposition Proxmire testified:
"I have found in 19 years in the Senate that very often a
statement on the floor of the Senate or something that
appears in the Congressional Record misses the atten~ion
of most members of the Senate, and virtually all members
of the House, because they don't read the Congressional
Record. If they are handed a news release, or something,
that is going to call it to their attention . . . . " App., at
220.
0

Respondents also argue that an essential part of the duties of
a Member of Congress is to inform constituents, as well as
other Members, of the issues being considered.
The Speech or Debate Clause has been directly passed on
by this Court relatively few times in 190 years. Eastland v.
United Servir;emen's Fund, 421 U. S'l'\(1975): Doe v. McMilZan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S.
606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972);
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 ( 1967) ; United States
v. Jnhnsnn, 383 U. S. 169 (1966): Kilbourn v. Thon1-pson, 103
U. S. 168 (1881). Literal reading of the Clause would, of
course, confine its protection narrowly to a "Speech or Debate
in either House." But the Court has given the Clause a practical rather than a strictly literal reading which would limit
the protection to utterances made within the four walls of
either Chamber. Thus, we have held that committee hearings are protected, even if held outside the Chambers; committee reports are also protected. Doe v. McMillan, supra;
Gravel v. United States, supra. Cf. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass.
1, 27-28 (1808).
The gloss going beyond a strictly literal reading of the
Clause has not, however, departed from the objective of pro-

.fi\
A
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tecting only legislative activities. In Thomas Jefferson's
VIew,
"[The privilege] is restrained to things done in the House
in a Parliamentary course, . . . . For [the Member] is
not to have privilege contra morem parliamentarium, to
/
exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty." T
Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice 20 (1851) :-reprinted in The Complete Jefferson 704 (S. Pado~
1943).

/

One of the draftsmen of the Constitution, James Wilson,
expressed a similar thought in lectures delivered between 1790
and 1792 while he was a Justice of this Court. He rejected
Blackstone's statement, 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *164,
that Parliament's privileges were preserved by keeping them
indefinite:
"Very different is the case with regard to the legislature of the United States. . . . The great maxims, upon
which our law of parliament is founded, are defined and
ascertained in our constitutions. The arcana of privilege, and the arcana of prerogative, are equally unknown
to our system of jurisprudence." 2 The Works of James
Wilson 35 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).13
In this respect Wilson was underscoring the very purpose of
our Constitution-inter alia, to provide written definitions of
-~ privileges>.=:-and immunities granted rather than
rely on evolving constitutional concepts identified from diverse sources as in English law. Like thoughts were expressed
by Joseph Story, writing in the first edition of this Commen.:.
taries on the Constitution in 1833:
"But this privilege is strictly confined to things done in
the course of parliamentary proceedings, and does not
13 But see T . Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice 15-16 (1854),
reprinted in The Complete Jefferson 702 (8. Padover ed. 1943) (quoting
Blackstone with approval).

?
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cover things done beyond the place and limits of duty.' 1
I d., § 863, at 320.
Cf. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 34 (1808).
In United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1971), we
acknowledged the historical roots of the Clause going back to
the long struggle between the English House of Commons and
the Tudor and Stuart monarchs when both criminal and civil
processes were employed by crown authority to intimidate
legislators. Yet we cautioned that the Clause
"must be interpreted in light of the America11 experience,
and in the context of the American constitutional scheme
of government rather than the English parliamentary
system. . . . [T]heir Parliament is the supreme authority, not a coordinate branch. Our speech or debate privilege was designed to preserve legislative independence,
not supremacy." 408 U. S., at 508.
Nearly a century ago, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S.
168, 204 (1881), this Court held that the Clause extended "to
things generally done in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the business before it." (Emphasis
added.) More recently we expressed a similar definition of
the scope of the Clause:
"Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart
of the Clause is speech or debate in either House. Insofar as the Cla.use is construed to reach other matters, th'3 y
must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respedt to the con- •
sideration al}d passage or rejection of proposed legislation
or with respect to other matters which the Constitution
places within the jurisdiction of either. House. As the
Court of Appeals· put it, ·the courts have · extended · the
privilege to matters beyond pure .speech or debate jn
either House, but 'only when necessary to prevent indirect
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impairment of such deliberations.'" Gravel v. United
States, supra, at 625 ~(quoting United States v.
Doe, 455 F. 2d 753, 760 (CAl 1972)) (emphasis added).
Cf. Doe v. McMillan, supra, at 313-314, 317; United States v.
Brewster, supra, at 512, 515-516, 517-518 .~.~Long v.
Ansell, 293 U. S. 76, 82 (1934).
Whatever imprecision there may be in the term "legislative
activities," it is clear that nothing in history or in the explicit
language of the Clause suggests any intention to create an
absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory statements made outside the Chamber. In Brewster, supra, at
507, we observed:
"The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were
not written into the Constitution simply for the personal
or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect
the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the
independence of individual legislators."
Claims under the Clause going beyond what is needed to protect legislative independence are to be closely scrutinized.
In Brewster we took note of this:
"The authors of our Constitution were well aware of both
the need for the privilege and the abuses that could flow
from too sweeping safeguards. In order to preserve other
values, they wrote the privilege so that it tolerates and
protects behavior on the part of Members not tolerated
and protected when done by other citizens, but the shield
does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the
integrity of the legislative process." I d., at 517 (emphasis added).
Indeed, the precedents abundantly support the conclusion \
that a Member may be held liable for republishing defamatory
state~r!gii1alry maae ill e1ther-nouse. We preceiv'e no
basis for departing from that long-established rule.
Justice Story in his Commentaries, for example, explained
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that there was no immunity for republication of a speech first
delivered in Congress:
"Therefore, although a speech delivered in the house of
commons is privileged, and the memb~r cannot be questioned respecting it elsewhere; yet, if he publishes his
speech, and it contains libellous matter, he is liable to an
action and prosecution therefore, as in common cases of
libel. And the same principles seem ap.plicable to the
privilege of debate and speech in congress. No man
ought to have a right to defame others under colour of a
performance of the duties of his office. And if he does
so in the actual discharge of his duties in congress, that
furnishes no reason, why he should be enabled through
the medium of the press to destroy the reputation, and
invade the repose of other citizens. It is neither within
the scope of his duty, nor in furtherance of public rights,
or public policy. Every citizen has as good a right to be
protected by the laws from malign~nt scandal, and false
charges, and defamatory imputations, as a member of
congress has to utter them in his seat." 14 J. Story, ComH Story acknowledged the arguments to the contrary: "It is proper,
however, to apprise the learned reader that it has been recently denied in
congress by very distinguished lawyers, that. the privilege of speech and
debate in congress does not extend to publication of his speech. And they
ground themselves upon an important. distinction arising from the actual
differences between English and American legislation. In the former, the
publication of the debates is not strictly lawful, except by license of the
house. In the latter, it is a common right, exercised and supported by the
direct encouragement of the body. This reasoning deserves a very attentive examination." J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 863, at
329--330 ( 1833) .
At oral argument counsel for respondents referred to a note in the fifth
edition of the Commentaries saying that the Speech or Debate Clause
protected the circulation to constituents of copies of speeches made in
Congress. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. In attributing the note to Story counsel
made an understandable mistake. As explained in the preface to the fifth
edition, that note was added by the editor, Melville Bigelow. The note

o...
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mentaries on the Constitution § 863, at 329 (1833) (emphasis added).
See also L. Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies in the United States of America ~ 604,
at p. 244 (2d ed. 1863).
Story summarized the state of the common law at the time
the Constitution was drafted recalling that Parliament had by
then succeeded in its struggle to secure freedom of debate.
But the privilege did not extend to republication of tibellous
remarks even though first made in Parliament. Thus,Tn Rex
v. Lord Abingdon, 1 Esp. 225, 170 Eng. Rep. 337 (N. P. 1794),
Lord Chief Justice Kenyon rejected Lord Abingdon's argument that parliamentary privilege protected him from suit for
republication of a speech first made in the House of Lords:
"[A]s to the words in question, had they been spoken in
the House of Lords, and confined to its walls, [the] Court
would have had no jurisdiction to call his Lordship before
them, to answer for them as an offence; but . . . in the
present case, the offence was the publication under his
authority and sanction, and at his expense: ... a member of Parliament had certainly a right to publish his
speech, but that speech should not be made the vehicle
of slander against any individual; if it was, it was a
libel. ... " Id., at 228, 170 Eng. Rep., at 338.
A similar result was reached in Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273,
105 Eng. Rep. 102 (K. B. 1813).
does not appear in Story's first edition. Moreover, it is clear from the
text of the note and the sources cited, that Bigelow did not mean that
there was absolute privilege for defamatory remarks contained in a speech
mailed to constituents as there would be if the mailing was protected by
t.he Speech or Debate Clause. Instead, he suggest that there was a qualified privilege, akin to that for accurate newspaper reports of legislative
proceedings. Cf. McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 347-348 (DC
1960) (republication of a speech has only qualified privilege). Since respondents have not claimed a qualified privilege we do not consider
whether they would be entitled to it.

.1 r f
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In Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 622-626 (1972),
we recognized that the doctrine denying immunity for republication had been accepted in the United States:
"[P]rivatc publication by Senator Gravel . . was in ·no
way essential to the deliberations of the Senate; nor docs
questioning as to the private publication threaten the
integrity or independence of the Senate by impermis_sibly
exposing its deliberations to executive influence." I d.,
at 625.
We reaffirmed that principle in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S.
306, 314-315 (1973):
"A Member of Congress may not with impunity publish
a libel from the speaker's stand in his home district, and
clearly the Speech or Debate Clause would not protect
such an act even though the libel was read from an official
committee report. The reason is that republishing a
libel under such circumstances is not an essential part of
the legislative process and is not part of that deliberative
process 'by which Members participate in committee and
House proceedings.'" (Quoting from Gravel v. United
States, 408 U. S. 606, 625 (1972).) 15
We reach a similar conclusion here. A speech by Proxmire
in the Senate would be wholly immune{!hd copies of that
speech would be available to other Members o~Congress and
the public through the Congressional Record;_] But neither
the newsletters nor the press release was "essential to the
deliberations of the Senate" and neither was part of the deliberative process.
Respondents, however, argue that newsletters and press releases are essential to the functioning of the Senate; without
It is worth noting that the Rules of the Senate forbid disparagement
of other Members on the floor. Senate Rule XIX (April 1979). See also
T. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice 40-41 (1854), reprinted
in The Complete Jefferson 714-715 (S. Padover ed. 1943).
15

-
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them, they assert, a Senator cannot have a significant impact
on the other Senators. \Ve may assume that a Member's
published statements exert some influence on other votes in
the Congress and therefore have a relationship to the legislative and deliberative process. But in Brewster, supra , at 512,
we rejected respondents' expansive reading of the Clause:

"It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in many activities other than the purely
legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause. These include ... preparing so-called 'news
letters' to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress."
There we ·went on to note that Johnson had carefully distinguished between what is only "related to the due functioning of the legislative process," and what constitdes the
legislative process entitled to immunity under the Clause:
"In stating that those things [Johnson's attempts to influence the Department of Justice] 'in no wise related to
the due functioning of the legislative process' were not
covered by the privilege, the Court did not in any sense
imply as a corollary that everything tha.t 'related' to the
office of a Member was shielded by the Clause. Quite
the contrary, in Johnson we held, citing Kilbourn v.
Thompson, supra, that only acts generally done in the
course of the process of enacting legislation were
protected.
"In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as
protecting all conduct relating to the legislative process."
"In its narrowest scope, the Clause is a very large, albeit
essential. grant of privilege. It has enabled reckless men
to slander [by speech or debate] and even destroy others
with impunity, but that was the conscious choice of the
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Framers. !d., at 513-516. · (Emphasis m original;
citations omitted.)
We are unable to discern any "conscious choice" to grant immunity for defamatory statements scattered far and wide by
mail, press)and the electronic media.
Respondents also argue that newsletters and press releases
are privileged as part of the "informing function" of Congress. Advocates of a broad reading of the "informing furiction" sometimes tend to confuse two uses of the term "informing." In one sense, Congress informs itself collectively
by way of hearings of its committees. It was in that sense
that Woodrow Wilson used "informing" in a statement quoted
by respondents. In reality, Wilson's . statement related · to
congressional efforts to learn of the activities of the Executive
Branch and administrative agencies; he did not include wideranging inquiries by individual Members on subjects of their
choice. Moreover, Wilson's statement itself clearly implies
a distinction between the informing function and the legislative function:
"Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be
helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every
form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is
most important that it should understand and direct .
.The informing function of Congress should be preferred
even to its legislative function. . . . [T]he only really
self-governing people is that people which discusses and
interrogates its administration. W. Wilson, Congressional Government 303 ( 1885).

It is in this narrower Wilsonian sense that this Court has
employed "informing" in previous cases holding that con-:-

)'
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gressional efforts to inform itself through committee hearings
are part of the legislative function.
The other sense of the term, and the one relied upon by
respondents, perceives it to be the duty of Members to tell the
public about their activities. Valuable and desirable as it
may be in broad terms, the transmittal of such information
by individual Members in order to inform the public and other
Members is not a part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative process.18 As a result,
transmittal of such information by press releases and newsletters is not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 ( 1973) , is not to the contrary. It dealt only with reports from congressional committees, and held that Members of Congress could not be held
liable for voting to publish a report. Voting and preparing
committee reports are the individual and collective expressions
of opinion within the legislative process. As such, they are
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Newsletters and
press releases, by contrast, are primarily means of informing
those outside the legislative forum; they represent the views
and will of a single Member. It does not disparage either
their value or their importance to hold that they are not entitled to the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.
We conclude, therefore, that the Speech or Debate Clause
does not protect newsletters or press releases and reverse that
part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding to the
contrary. "'We do not reach the other questions presented by
the petition for certiorari but remand the case to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

~~?

~~

Provision for the use of the frank, 39 U . S. C. § 3210, does not alter
J-A
our conclusion. Congress, by granting franking privileges, stationery al- -t~ lA ~
lowances, and facilities to record speeches and statements for ra.dio broadcast cannot expand the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause to render
~t~ ~
immune all that emanates via use of such helpful facilities.
Ll,
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In substance the Chief's opinion seems fairly good.

I

think it has two problems, however, one major and one minor.
The minor problem is on page 17, in the last full
paragraph, where the opinion states:

"A speech by Proxmire in

the Senate would be wholly immune and copies of that speech
would be available to other Members of Congress and the public
through the Congressional Record."(emphasis added)

The

italicized portion of that sentence strongly implies that
publication in the Congressional Record also would be wholly
immune.

Yet the opinion, on page 4 note 4, expressly disclaims

deciding whether the Congressional Record is covered by the
Clause.
It seems to me that the Court would do well not to
decide this question.

Some functions of the Congressional

Record probably are covered, but I doubt that every publication
and distribution is.

Certainly Proxmire could not put his

speech in the Record, then distribute xeroxed copies to his
constituents and still claim the privilege.
In short, I
recommend the italicized language be deleted.

The major problem is the disposition of the balance of
the case.

Having decided that Proxmire's conduct is not

privileged under the Clause, the Court must say something
further about it.

As I understood the sense of the Conference,

the balance of the judgment dismissing the case was to be
vacated and the court below was to be directed to reach the
state-law question ahead of the First Amendment issues. The
Chief's opinion, however, does not do this.
Indeed, it fairly
could be read as affirming that portion of the judgment of the
court below not based on the Speech or Debate Clause.
I am confident that you do not wish to affirm any
portion of the judgment;

my recollection is that you consented

only with reluctance to a disposition that would not reverse on
First Amendment grounds as well.

I recommend that you ask the

Chief to add something on page 10 of the opinion and in the
final paragraph directing the court below to decide the state
law question and making it clear that the Court does not
the resolution of the First Amendment issue by the court

May 28, 1979

78-680 Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Chief:
I am not entirely clear as to the scope of your
"holding" in this case.
You conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause does
not protect newsletters or oress releases, and "reverse that
part of the judgment of the Court of A~peals". But you "do
not reach the other questions ~resented • • • [andl remand
the case to th~ Court of Appeals for further proceedings".
The other two questions as identified in the
op1n1on are (i) whether. Hutchinson is a public fiqure, and
(ii) whether respondents were entitled to summary judgment.
There was, as I understood it, another question: what should
we do about the final holding of the District Court that even
if Hutchinson were a "private person • • • relevant state law
dictates the grant of summary judgment". The Court of
Appeals was silent on this state-law issue. My recollection
is that a majority of the Conference thought we should vacate
the judgment of CA7 in its entirety, and remand the case to
it to consider first the state-law issue (which could be
decisive), and thereafter- if reached- the "private person"
issue under federal law.

My own view, expressed at Conference, was that in
addition to deciding the Speech or Debate Clause issue, we
should hold that Hutchinson is a private rather than a public
person, and resolve that issue. Otherwise, on remand, CA7
may well reaffirm its decision that Hutchinson was a public
figure, if it gets by the state law question. We-then will
probably be called upon to review the case again.
But my view did not prevail at Conference. I
therefore am willing to join your opinion for the Court if
the entire judgment of CA7 is vacated, and the remand is

2.

limited to the state-law issue. I possibly could join the
judgment if the decision below iq vacat~d, ~nd the remand is
limited first to the state-law isSUP and then to the "private
person" question.
I think your treatment of the Speech or DRbate
Clause is excellent.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
P.S. On page 17, the sentence near the bottom to the effect
that a Senator's speech may be available to the "oublic
through the Conqressional Record" may need to be clarified.
This might be construed to allow a Senator to ~eproduce
copies of the Conqr~ssional Record and mail them, with full
protection of the Clause, to a 100,000 people as did Proxmire
with his newsletter.
lfp/ss

.:§upum.t ~curl o-f tqt ~ttittb ~hdte
..aelfingttm. ~. ~· · 211,?'1.~
CHAMBERS OF

.

May 29, 1979

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Chief:
This is in response to your note of May 26,
circulated today. At Conference I took the position
that the petitioner was not a public figure.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

•

.§npmtt.t ~nmt of tfr~ ~ttitdt .;§taus

)rasfrittgtnn. ~. QJ.
CHAMBERS OF

20gtJ.l.~

May 29, 1979

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire & Schwartz

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Si:ncerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
erne

<!JMttt ttf tqt ~a ,jtatts
._asftinghtn. ~. <!J. 2!l,?'k$

,ju.p:rttttt

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

May 29, 1979
Re: No. 78-680, Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Lewis:
As I indicated in my post-circulation memorandum to the
Conference, I would be willing to add a section to hold that
Hutchinson was not a public figure, if there are five votes for
that position under the circumstances of this case. There are
sound reasons to dispose of that issue, which is essentially a
question of law.
In response to your note, the present draft holds that the
Speech or Debate Clause does not protect the newsletters or
press releases. The CA7 should also realize that on remand it
must consider whether the District Court correctly resolved the
state law question. To avoid any uncertainty about that
holding, however, I am quite willing to change the final
sentence of the opinion to read: "We do not reach the other
questions presented by the petition for certiorari; instead, we
vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion, in
particular, to determine whether the District Court correctly
resolved the question of state law."
Bill Rehnquist's opinion in Wolston v. Reader's Digest may
well have an influence on the CA7's view on remand. I will
take that into account when Wolston comes around.
The comment on page 17 about the Congressional Record is,
or at least I thought, a non-committal observation of the fact
that everyone has access to the Congressional Record. I did
not think this conflicted with note 4. However, I will see if
there is need to neutralize it. Perhaps striking the phrase
"copies of that speech" would do the trick.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

May 29, 1979

78-680 Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Chief:
Thank you for your memos on the above case.
In response to your inquiry, I think we should
reach and decide the "public fiqure" issue.
As I have indicated, it would not be unreasonable
for CA7 to adh~re to the view that Hutchinson is a public
figure unless we decide the question. It has been argued and
I think it was before us.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

~ltpr.tm:t Ofqnrlltf tlrt ~ftb ~htttll'

Ji¥.ltittghm. ~.
CHA~BERS

Of.

2.0~}J.$

OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVE N S

May 29, 1979

Re:

78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Chief:
Although I would also join an opinion holding
that Hutchinson is not a public figure, as suggested
by Lewis, I am prepared to join your opinion in its
present form.
Respectfully,

~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

j;u:puntt Q}llltrl of tqt ~~ ,jhtttll
~rurfrin-gtttn.lfl. <!f. 2iT&TJI.~
CHAMBER S OF

May 30, 1979

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Chief:
It is my view that the petitioner is not a
public figure, and I hope that in this opinion we
can hold that he is not. The only substantial
affirmative problem I have with your circulated
opinion concerns the last sentence of footnote 14
on page 16. This sentence seems implicitly to
suggest that the defendants may enjoy a qualified
privilege as a matter of federal law.
I do not agree,
and believe we would only be borrowing trouble in making such a suggestion. Accordingly, I hope that you
/ will be willing to delete this sentence.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

Qfcttrl cl tJrt ~tb' .;§tatt.s
jlrcu!p:ttghm.1§. Qf. 2n~~~

.:§n:prtttt.t

/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 5, 1979

Re:

No. 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your presently circulating draft in
this case. I would have no objection to reaching the "public
figure" issue if it can be done without violating the
traditional maxim that we avoid constitutional adjudication
unless it is necessary.
I am entirely satisfied with your
reason for reaching the Speech or Debate Clause expressed
in the present circulation, but think it might be a trickier
job to reach the "public figure" issue in the case.

I(

Sincerely/"

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

\.

/

<If curl cf tqt ~nittb ;§taUs
~asfrin:ghm. ~. <If. 2!l~.ll-.:J

;ittpTmtt

CHAMBERS OF'

June 7' 1979

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

No. 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Chief,
I am still with you.
Sincerely yours,

!4----------

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

erne

lfp/ss

~npume

{!fcurlltf flrt ~niult .:§hrltll'

~rur.£ringtcn.l9.

<q.

20gt'!~

Ct-4AMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 7, 19?9

Re:

78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxrnire

Dear Chief:

My join still holds.
Respectfully,

i~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

~u:p-rtntt

<qa-ttd cf t4t 'JI;ittitt~ ~htus
'~htsJri:ttgtctt, 111. <!f. 20&f'12

CHAMB E R S OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 11, 1979

Re:

No. 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Chief:
Please "join" or "re-join" me in your most recent
circulation, whichever is appropriate.
Sincerely,

~vThe Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

j)uprtntt <!fond of t4t ~b ;§taftg

1lhtllJrhtghtn. ~. <!f.

2.0gP~~

CHAMI!IERS Of"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 19, 1979

Re:

No. 78-680 - Hutchinson '-:· l?roxmire

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

f. fYI .
T ,M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

~uprtntt (!fmtrlltf Urt~~ .®taUs
~cur~~. Q]. 20gtJI.~
C HAMBERS OF

JUST I C E POTTER S T EWART

June 20, 1979

Re:

No. 78-680, Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Dear Chief,
I regret my inadvertence in not responding
earlier to your recirculation. Please add the following at the foot of your opinion for the Court:
Mr. Justice Stewart joins in all
but footnote 10 of the Court•s op1n1on.
He cannot agree that the question whether
a communication by a Congressman or a member of his staff with a federal agency is
entitled to Speech or Debate Clause immunity depends upon whether the communication
is defamatory. Because telephone calls to
federal agency officials are a routine and
essential part of the Congressional oversight function, he believes such activity
is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.
This brief statement reflects the views I
voicedduring our Conference discussion.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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